FROM SADCC TO SADC AND BEYOND: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Maxi Schoeman

‘We continually create the world we desire, and deserve the world we get.’

Introduction
Classical economic integration theory would have it that regional integration is an economic process occurring largely as a result of greater interaction between neighbouring states, functioning almost like some kind of invisible hand. This theory is based on the historical example of the development of the European Union, yet it completely discounts the fact that the European Union was first and foremost a political project. Such also has been the case with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the world’s oldest customs union, and with the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) and its successor, the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the extent to which politics, rather than economic considerations, has determined the establishment and functioning of SADCC (1980-1993) and thereafter of SADC (from 1993) and to point out the impact that these politics-driven processes has had on the development of the southern African region. In the first section a number of concepts are briefly defined, though already in the discussion of concepts such as ‘regionalisation’ the political nature of regional integration projects will become evident. Section 2 pays attention to the establishment and history of the development of SADCC, while section 3 deals with the transformation of SADCC into SADC and the impact that the politics surrounding the new members of this organisation (South Africa and the DRC) has had on the functioning of the organisation since 1994.

1. Concepts
This section will not argue the case for adopting particular definitions for the concepts ‘region’, regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’, but merely provides a brief definition of each to clarify the analysis in sections 2 and 3. It should be pointed out, though, that particularly in the case of the concept ‘region’, there is an extensive body of literature dealing with the problems of defining a region.

Region
A region is a part or segment of the world that consists of more than two states in physical proximity which consciously share patterns of interaction at various levels, the territorial totality of which is considered a recognizable entity by other entities who form the region and also by the external environment. Such an entity, though, is not a given and in terms of its borders can contract or expand over time. Its shared patterns of interaction can be characterised either by patterns of amity or enmity.
Regionalism
Whereas ‘region’ denotes space and place, regionalism denotes an aim or objective, and the term has both a normative and a descriptive connotation. A normative understanding relates to the aims, goals and driving forces that underlie and determine conscious efforts by the members of a region to increase and/or control various forms of interaction and cooperation. It is, in the words of Evans and Newnham,iv ‘a complex of attitudes, loyalties and ideas which concentrates the minds of people/s upon what they perceive to be “their” region.’ Regionalism becomes a political project when cross-border transactions, and the perceived need for closer cooperation are recognized by the member states when governments react to these internal and external forces by means of attempting to find a transnational level of governance.

Regionalisation
Although often used as synonymous with ‘regionalism’, regionalisation refers to the process/es through which ‘regioness’ is increased. The idea does not express an evolutionary logic, but a logic that depends on what the aims and goals of regionalisation are and one that indicates levels of complexity in terms of regional interaction. Regionalisation is often treated as largely a political phenomenon – a process initiated by states and stimulated and driven by the global economic demands and challenges of the spread of economic liberalism. This view is based on the influential market integration theory articulated by authors such as Viner and Balassa.v The idea of regionalisation is often implicitly presented as being a largely cooperative process – states in various regions ‘band’ together for their mutual benefit and in this way formulate and execute a proper, efficient and profitable response to global economic demands and trends. In reality of course this is seldom so. Regionalisation does not necessarily promote peaceful and cooperative development and interaction and very often persisting or new areas of conflict can be ascribed to the very nature of global economics with its emphasis on competition between states for markets and investment.

2. SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa’s regional hegemony
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)vi was established in 1980 in terms of the ‘Lusaka Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation.’ To treat SADCC purely as an attempt at economic regionalism or development coordination and cooperation would be to miss much about the original driving forces behind the establishment of the organisation, though the OAU’s 1980 Lagos Plan of Action did encourage the principle of sub-regional economic cooperation as building blocs for a continental economic union.vi The EEC (as it was then) also encouraged the concept of economic liberation, taking part in the initial deliberations and meetings prior to the launch of SADCC.vi

Yet SADCC was, in essence, a politically motivated response and ‘defensive mechanism’vii by the Front line States (FLS)x to the PW Botha government in South Africa’s idea of a ‘constellation of states’ in the region.xi SADCC’s main objective was to reduce economic dependence on and vulnerability to South
Africa through building economic and particularly infrastructural security in the region. In this way a basis for development of the various states of southern Africa would be laid. Although influenced by continental moves towards intensified regionalisation, SADCC was first and foremost the brainchild of the leaders of the Front Line States (FLS) who established SADCC as the ‘economic pillar’ of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the region. The role of the FLS as a political-security organisation in southern Africa should not be underestimated. As Clapham points out, since independence Africa tended to strive for regional cooperation for the sake of safeguarding and strengthening individual statehood and the FLS would set the pattern for the way in which post-colonial regional cooperation in southern Africa would develop:

- Each state cooperated and contributed according to its means and needs in terms of its own definition of these.
- There was constant and explicit recognition of each other’s independent sovereignty and that this was not to be compromised through cooperation.
- To emphasise that the whole purpose of regional cooperation served to strengthen the state and to ensure that independent statehood would come to the rest of the region (Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa) – the minimum level of institutionalization was allowed and catered for. This would later, in the case of SADCC result in a highly decentralised organizational structure that lacked ‘a regional point to make coordination more effective’.
- No formal agreements underpinned the establishment of the FLS and in the case of SADCC there would be no Treaty.
- Cooperation was largely characterised by crisis response as the way in which it was managed.
- The way in which the FLS operated (ad hoc, not institutionalised, not built on a formal Treaty or Constitution, statist in approach, heavy emphasis on individual leadership and initiatives, no checks and balances or transparency) would in later years create immense problems in terms of leadership and the institutionalisation of security relations in the region.

The extent to which SADCC was a politically constituted ‘region’ was already obvious in its membership. Apart from the fact that economically the exclusion of South Africa made no sense, a country as the (then) Zaire was also excluded, despite the fact that in geographical terms at least it made more sense to include it rather than Tanzania. However, Tanzania had been part of the FLS since its inception, had harboured South African-ANC dissidents for many years and had generally been very active in the liberation struggle waged against the white regimes in (then) Rhodesia and South Africa. From a regional-economic perspective, though, Tanzania historically formed part of the East African Community (together with Uganda and Kenya) – a customs union that disintegrated in the mid 1970s due to conflict amongst its members over the distribution of resources and gains. The conflict stemmed mainly from the fact that the countries pursued such different economic policies that, in turn, were based on different ideologies. Kenya, for example, followed a largely capitalist approach, whilst Tanzania predicated its economy on an
Africanised form of socialism under the influence of its (then) president, Nyerere. Zaire, on the other hand, was excluded from SADCC membership because of its support for and cooperation with South Africa, as well as its open sympathy with and support for the UNITA rebel movement in Angola.

SADCC adopted a Programme of Action that identified defined economic activities and development projects to be pursued. Cooperation in the field of transport infrastructure was the prime concern of the organisation in order to lessen dependence on South Africa. Despite, or perhaps because of the success achieved in this sector, it also became one of the main targets of South Africa’s destabilisation policy during the 1980s. The project-based approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector focused attention on the coordination of members’ development initiatives rather than on formulating a regional economic development strategy. The aim was to boost the activities of the individual states in the areas of infrastructure and productive sectors (mining, agriculture etc.) and not to establish and promote regional integration. This aim would only come to the fore in the early 1980s.

The project-based approach with each member taking responsibility for a particular sector (e.g. Angola for energy, Mozambique for transport, Swaziland for human resources development) focused attention on the coordination of members’ development initiatives, rather than on formulating a regional economic development strategy. The aim was to boost the activities of the individual states in the areas of infrastructure and productive sectors. Cooperation in the field of transport infrastructure was, however, the prime concern of the organisation, given the land-locked countries of the region’s dependence on South Africa for the transport of goods and developments in this sector became one of the main targets of South Africa’s destabilisation policy of the 1980s.

The sectoral responsibility approach resulted in a highly decentralized organizational structure with a small secretariat in Gaborone and in a highly uneven distribution of efficiency and effectiveness within the various sectors. As Ostergaard points out, SADCC was ‘conceived as a service organisation rather than a leader of the countries who constitute it.’ Politically, though, such an approach had its benefits. It underscored the basic principle of equality amongst members, regardless of size or relative power, fostering a sense of equal worth, a quality that might stand the smaller states in good stead in future when they have to negotiate benefits and other relevant policies regarding distribution opportunities, resources and capacity for themselves at the regional level. The sectoral approach also fostered a sense of common identity and common responsibility with every member, regardless of size, having a role to play.

On the other hand, member states were expected to provide finance for their coordinating activities on behalf of SADCC. Unavoidably, due to the general poverty and limited financial resources of many SADCC states, certain sectors were neglected, particularly the crucially important human resources development sector under the responsibility of Swaziland. Because of the
level of under-development and general lack of resources and financial
capacity of SADCC member states, the organisation was heavily dependent
on donor funding, each sector procuring funds for projects in its own realm.
Such an approach, apart from the obvious dangers of unevenness and
differences in approach and commitment inherent in it, also opened up the
possibility that donors might have undue influence on certain sectors as the
were dealing, by implication, with SADCC on a bilateral basis. Donor
dependency further meant that the preferences of donors, and not necessarily
of the region, would dominate SADCC activities. A last problem related to the
decentralized structure and approach of SADCC was that donors often
refrained from actually providing the financial assistance that they had
pledged, because the relevant sectors did not have the capacity to utilise such
aid, a problem that has also plagued SADC.

During its existence SADCC saw an immense growth in the number of
projects under its Programme of Action, and the proliferation of new sectors to
provide for new needs. Over time the organisation also changed or modified
its approach to cooperation. Towards the late 1980s, at the time of the
continental deliberations that would result in the Abuja Treaty of 1991,
SADCC initiated a move away from specific projects towards the coordination
of sectoral plans and programmes, and from the development of infrastructure
to measures intended for the promotion of investment and production.\textsuperscript{5vii}

The above changes point to an early awareness by SADCC members of the
importance of the need to respond to international and regional changes and
global forces, as would later be illustrated in the SADC Declaration of 1993.
The changes also show to what extent the organisation was moving towards
acceptance of conventional liberal economic doctrine on the importance of
trade liberalisation, a trend encouraged by international financial institutions,
such as the IMF through structural adjustment programmes. These changes
within SADCC point to the evolution of a regionalism characterized by a sense
of a shared destiny; member states increasingly articulated their needs,
preferences and objectives in terms of their being part of the region and these
aspects as being indivisible. But although predicated on economic and
infrastructural development coordination through cooperation at the regional
level, SADCC was first and foremost part of a security strategy implemented
by the FLS – the organisation that had taken responsibility for the region’s
security in military-political terms. Yet in establishing SADCC, the FLS did
show a measure of farsightedness – it started drawing the connections
between security and development, even though both were rather narrowly
defined initially and did this in an era before it had become ‘fashionable’ to link
these two aspects.

3. From SADCC to SADC and from high politics to low politics
The transformation of SADCC into the Southern African Development
Community (SADC)\textsuperscript{viii} through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty is a prime example
of the extent to which the southern African region has taken cognisance of
change at various levels and has moved towards and adjustment to such
change, using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of
the region. The Declaration that precedes the Treaty of the new organisation (SADC) contained a brief overview and analysis of the new opportunities and demands raised by change in the region and in the external environment and attempted to harness these changes or to use change as a justification and motivation for closer cooperation and community building purposes.

External driving forces that informed the change from SADCC into SADC were much more economically oriented than the mainly political-security considerations that underlay the earlier establishment of SADCC. Economic globalisation with its emphasis on economic liberalisation, increased bloc-formation and the globalisation of finance and production played a major part in the decision to transform the organisation into one that would, at least in theory, concentrate on regional integration, rather than regional cooperation for the sake of strengthening and protecting individual member states.

Transforming SADCC into SADC represented and increased emphasis on responding to international trends through mobilisation of the region’s own resources, potential and capacity. Furthermore, the changed international political landscape at the end of the Cold War, together with the demise of apartheid in South Africa, shifted international emphasis on traditional military-political security to a concentration on a much broader definition of security that included economic, environmental and societal security. Economic growth and development within a distinctly neo-liberal economic paradigm became the new ideological driving force that governed decisions, also at the regional level. However, during the almost 10 years of its existence (SADC was established in 1993), the organisation has not yet resolved the question about a regional bank that could underpin and promote increased regionalisation.

Demands for increased liberalisation were met by the SADC Protocol on Free Trade in 1996, an agreement that contained a detailed strategy for achieving a free trade area in the region within eight years, but a project which eventually took much longer to ratify than had been expected. The main reason for the protracted negotiations that followed upon the signing of the Protocol, had to do with South Africa’s economic strength in the region and pertain more to economic considerations than purely political concerns, indicating the extent to which the region’s relations are increasingly determined by economic considerations. Because of the structure of the majority of economies that make up SADC (low levels of industrialization, heavy reliance on primary commodities), trade liberalisation in the form of intra-regional trade will have little benefit for most countries as they simply do not produce commodities that are tradable intra-regionally. In fact, it is estimated that the implementation of the trade protocol will expand regional income by only 0.33%, whilst another study estimates that employment and GDP will increase by 1%. Member countries were particularly sensitive to the possibilities of endangering local industries should they open up their markets to bigger regional producers that could ‘flood’ their markets with cheap(er) products.
South Africa, in particular, was feared and suspected of an interest in regional free-trade for the benefits that would accrue to its own economy, a suspicion that was not completely unfounded, given the history of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and of trade relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe during the mid-1990s. Tension between South Africa and its neighbours in SADC also came to the fore once South Africa started negotiating a free trade agreement with the European Union, not initially taking the concerns of other SADC members into account, despite the fact that the SADC Free Trade Protocol effectively ruled out the possibility of individual SADC countries choosing their own options for future trade relations with the EU. What bothered its neighbours most, were the trade-diversion effects of an agreement between South Africa and the EU. After its initial ‘go-it-alone’ approach, the South Africans did, however, include the concerns of their neighbours in their negotiations with the Europeans, although it is in no way certain that the eventual agreement reached in 2000 will not inhibit regional efforts at integration or access to South African markets for products from its neighbours in the face of European produce that might muscle these out.

But it was not only development in its external environment that necessitated the change from SADCC to SADC – from ‘mere’ regional coordination to an attempt at regional integration. Within the southern African region major changes had taken place during the early 1990s, changing the political face of the region and raising expectations of peace and security, and an opportunity for development. Within the region, apartheid came to an end with the unbanning of the ANC and the release of (former President) Mandela and other liberation movement leaders in early 1990. At that point it was clear that it was only a matter of time before South Africa would be politically acceptable to its neighbours and therefore able to join a regional organisation. The underlying rationale for the establishment of SADCC had therefore fallen away and with the prospect of the region’s biggest and strongest economy joining its neighbours, the role and function of SADCC could be revisited and a new organisation, taking the changed political nature of the region into consideration, could be formed. SADC was therefore not only a result of or response to changing international trends and demands, but also a response to a changed political climate within the region.

It is clear that globalisation, and in particular the neo-liberal economic paradigm that was spread through this process, had a great impact on the way in which the southern African region perceived its own future in the early 1990s. In view of the region’s history and under circumstances of economic hardship and a host of problems ranging from internal political instability to food, health and environmental insecurity, looking past and cooperating beyond immediate national demands and needs, SADC was established in order to create the enabling environment that would allow for such ‘deep integration’. That the change to SADC also meant a greater emphasis on economic (rather than political and security) considerations, is clear when one looks at the expanded membership of the organisation. Both Mauritius and the Seychelles are island states, geographically rather far removed from the sub-continent, and with little if any cultural or historical ties to the mainland.
However, the negotiations that preceded the adoption of the applications for membership by these two countries, clearly indicate that it was above all their economic potential and performance that made them attractive and acceptable to SADC.

Another important consideration for the transformation of SADCC into SADC was that the former had, by the late 1980s, become an unwieldy institution that had witnessed an immense growth in the number of projects under its Programme of Action and a proliferation of sectors to provide for new needs. The need was felt to consolidate these and to concentrate more on regional projects, rather than on individual/national projects. The intention was also to promote investment and production, rather than emphasizing infrastructural development. In short, SADCC had to be transformed to accommodate new trends in the global economy and new political (and economic) realities within the region. In short, it needed a new approach to development and a new institution to implement development strategies.

In the light of the above, the new organisation settled on a number of decisions in order to streamline its activities and to ensure efficiency. Three decisions are of particular importance. The first was the decision to adopt a two-pronged approach to development, in effect combining two rather different development approaches. The purpose of this approach that combines market liberalisation (in essence the traditional regional integration model) and development integration is to achieve ‘deeper integration’, a process aimed at addressing the problem of lack of capacity: ‘underdeveloped production structures and inadequate infrastructure’ according to the 2000 SADC Regional Human Development Report. Yet, the market liberalisation part of the approach holds important economic implications for some of the countries and these implications, in turn, might have a political impact inside member countries, and also amongst them. Removing tariff barriers, for instance, would result in a huge revenue loss for Swaziland and Lesotho as members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). By the mid-1990s 40% of Swaziland’s revenue and 70% of that of Lesotho came from the revenue sharing formula of SACU. The fact is that a development integration approach implies a continued and active role for the state in the regionalisation project, and therefore this process will remain a deeply political one.

The second decision made by the new organisation, was to adopt the principle of a Tribunal in terms of articles 9 (1), 16 and 32 with the purpose of settling disputes that might arise from interpretation of the SADC Treaty. It holds the possibility of influencing the general direction, pace and nature of regionalisation as its interpretative powers could be used to guide the organisation’s development. However, by 2002 the Tribunal had not yet been established and the main reason lies in SADC members’ fear of losing part of, or aspects of, their sovereignty and sovereignty seems to be the most prized of the ‘possession’ of African states. The SADC Declaration preceding and accompanying the organisation’s Treaty states that ‘some decisions that were previously taken by individual states are taken regionally.... Regional decision-making also implies elements of change in the locus and context of
sovereignty…’ The shift, though, to a ‘change in the locus and context of sovereignty’ has not yet taken place, mainly because southern African states, on the whole, joined SADC in order to strengthen them as individual states and not necessarily to strengthen the region per se, a process that would require some form of supranational authority to be vested in the organisation. At the same time, even though still only a ‘paper decision’, the idea of power and authority being shifted, in some instances, to the regional level, does indicate an awareness of what it would take to integrate the region.

The third decision was to appoint a ‘Committee of Four’ (Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) to oversee the ‘Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action’ in 1996. This decision also took a substantial amount of time before the report that emanated from the project was eventually accepted at the Summit Meeting of 2001: the investigation was already announced in 1995 at a Council of Ministers meeting. The recommendation that the organisation be restructured and the SADC Programme of Action be rationalised, resulted in a far-reaching recommendation, later adopted by Summit, that the existing sectoral commissions (in some cases known as sector co-ordinating units), inherited from SADCC (see previous sub-section), would be replaced with sectoral commissions or planning and co-ordination directorates. This means bringing the number of commissions/units down from twenty plus, to five directorates, thereby streamlining the work of the organisation. More importantly, though, is that the tendency of sectoral commissions to promote national rather than regional activities was checked by the new structure, and the fact that these structures will no longer be located within national departments, but will consist of staff members drawn from different member countries, based on merit and skill, also points to a (albeit slow) change of focus from the national level to the regional level that might change the political ‘substructure’ of the organisation in that it will probably in the medium term result in the development of a regional bureaucracy with a loyalty to the organisation, rather than to individual states.

The fact of the matter is that the SADC region has experienced a steady decline in the level of human development: by 1998 it was lower than in 1995, despite an increase in intra-regional trade. Politics still plays a large role in regional interaction and the extent of cooperation amongst members. This is particularly telling in the realm of regional armed conflicts, with a clear ‘faultline’ dividing SADC members, most visible in the DRC conflict. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola support an armed ‘solution’ to the conflict, whilst South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique are in favour of a peaceful settlement and the withdrawal of foreign (amongst them Zimbabwean) troops from the conflict. This faultline also manifests itself in the slow progress being made in various ongoing negotiations within the region, e.g. the re-negotiation of the SACU agreement, tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe particularly with regard to trade aspects and tension between South Africa and Swaziland related to the lack of democratization in the case of the latter.

4. Conclusion
In an era during which most African regional cooperation schemes were still intent on market integration, no matter how irrelevant (and even damaging) to national economies, and approaching such schemes through large bureaucracies, SADCC followed a different approach. It refrained from over-ambitious market integration plans, refused to set up large, top-heavy institutions and attempted to deal with those areas most in need of development, namely transport and communication.

In the process it succeeded in allying the fears of members of losing their independence and attempted to focus (and thereby promote) the existing strengths of members by allocating sectoral responsibilities according to available capacity. Yet, in some of its very strengths, SADC as successor so SADCC now also faces some of its biggest challenges. The move towards development integration requires that the member states look anew at the issues of decentralisation versus centralization and, by implication, to allow SADC a more independent role and identity. For some SADC members such a move constitutes a threat – a supra-national organisation might undermine their sovereignty and it is their political independence that these states (very often, their rather undemocratic governments) value above all else. The principle of equality (rather than equity) within SADCC was at times carried to ineffective extremes. The fact that all members, notwithstanding levels of development and availability of resources, contributed exactly the same to the running costs of the organizations through membership fees, seriously hampered development efforts. On the other hand, an undeniable strength of the organisation lay in its ability to learn from its experiences and to adjust and change. The transformation of SADCC into SADC was the prime example of this advantage.

To the extent that one can compare the underlying dynamics of the establishment of SADCC and later its transformation into SADC, the most salient aspects of the process are the impact of the globalisation of liberal economic thought and practice on the region and the impact of the end of apartheid in South Africa. Whereas SADCC was established by the FLS to promote economic independence from South Africa and to strengthen individual states in the region through development cooperation, SADC looks to increasing economic integration of the full southern African region in order to promote development and as a response to the demands of economic liberalism. The process of regionalisation remains a politically-driven, top-down approach, however, often fraught with political tensions between the region’s two biggest states, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

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1 Prof Maxi Schoeman is head of the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. E-mail: mschoeman@postino.up.ac.za


Membership: Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Botswana. Namibia joined the organisation in 1990 on gaining independence.

Evans, LH, 1996, ‘Opening address by the Director-General of Foreign Affairs Mr LH Evans, at the SADC Induction/Refresher Course’, Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1-4 July.


The FLS was established in the late 1970s as a focus point for the anti-colonial struggle in southern Africa. The original members were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (and briefly Nigeria), and after it gained independence in 1980, Zimbabwe joined and acted as chair of the organisation for most of its existence. The FLS was a loose association of states that acted in an ad hoc fashion, responding to political needs and crises as these arose – its main focus was the anti-apartheid struggle and pre-1980 the struggle against the Smith regime in (then) Rhodesia. See Schoeman, M, 1998, Building a Secure Community in Southern Africa: The Case of SADC, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, pp136-139.


One should be careful though not to conclude that regional integration attempts in contemporary southern Africa are now firmly grounded in economic terms and concerns of the various member states. Politics still plays an important role, as is clearly illustrated in the way in which the region has been dealing with the complex


For an overview of the development of SACU and the extent to which South Africa benefited from this agreement in terms of its own industrialisation, see Maasdorp, G, 1994, ‘The future structure of regional trade integration and development cooperation in Southern Africa’, Africa Insight, 24 (1), pp5-10.


See ‘Annotated Agenda: Summit Meeting, Johannesburg’, Department of Foreign Affairs (SA), Pretoria, 28 August 1995. This agenda contains the notes by officials of South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs to the (then) minister of foreign affairs, Mr Nzo, on reasons why SA should support the application for membership by Mauritius. The original un-annotated agenda shows that the SADC Secretariat had some qualms about the application as Mauritius did not fit the membership criteria set by the organisation.


See report issued by (SA) Department of Foreign Affairs, 17 September 1996 also entitled ‘Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action’. 