China and India in the Global Governance Arena

Dirk Messner, German Development Institute
(Director)

John Humphrey, Institute of Development Studies
(Professorial Fellow)

1 Introduction

The debate on global governance that began at the end of the Cold War reflected the recognition that accelerating globalisation was creating cross-border and global problems that could not be solved within the ambit of nation states pursuing go-it-alone policies. Rather, these problems needed to be tackled politically on the basis of new forms of "governance beyond the nation state" (Zürn 1998; Rosenau 1997, Donahue and Nye 2000, Kennedy et al. 2002). International financial crises, banking regulation, global climate change, international property rights, migration flows, humanitarian interventions, and the fight against transnational terrorism have increasingly become the objects of global policy processes, along with continued concern with long-established questions such as the international trade regime.

The purpose and goal of global governance are defined against this background as the "development of a system of institutions and rules as well as of new mechanisms of international cooperation that make it possible to deal on a continuous basis with the problems posed by global challenges and transboundary phenomena" (Messner 2000, 284). The main aim of global governance is to avoid crises and turbulence within the global system, with an increasing range of issues seen as potentially threatening. But global governance amounts to more than this: it also has developmental objectives. For much of the 1990s, these were framed as a neo-liberal policy agenda aimed at promoting faster economic growth through internal and external liberalisation. Increasing global integration was seen as a positive factor for economic growth (see, for example, World Bank 2002), although the increasing salience of discussions addressing issues such as "managing globalisation" or "making globalisation work for the poor" indicated a perception that globalisation processes would need to be managed politically if they were to promote inclusive development.1

The global governance discourse of the 1990s was geared to strengthening a multilateral world order and creating new patterns of cooperation between governmental and private actors. Indeed, this was the period in which corporations and NGOs became more prominent in global governance. Private and public-private organisations became more important in a variety of global governance institutions, and in particular in standards setting around product safety, quality, finance, labour and the environment (Nadvi and Wältring 2004, Humphrey 2005). Scholte (2000: 151) refers to the trend of private sector actors playing an increasing role in regulatory activities at the global level as the "privatisation of governing".2

Nevertheless, the emergence of a multi-actor, multi-level global governance system did not appear to create space for effective participation by developing countries in global governance institutions (Rodrik 1997, Maggi and Messner 2002). The limited participation and influence of developing countries in global governance institutions is often remarked upon. Even in trade negotiations, which have provided many opportunities for developing

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1 See, for example, Aninat (2002) and statements from UN organizations on the need to manage processes of globalization.
2 Cited in Higgins and Lawrence (2005: 5).
countries to develop understanding and capabilities, the most decisive indication of developing country capacity to frame agendas and stake out positions occurred as recently as the negotiations leading up to the Doha Round. Similarly analyses of developing country participation in the many fora that define and apply the technical rules that have such an important impact on trade frequently point to the limited participation of developing countries. In this context, one concern of policymakers has been to enhance the participation of developing countries in such fora through the training for negotiators and technical staff and supporting participation in meetings.

The marginalisation of developing countries in global fora was exacerbated by the events of September 11, 2001, which shifted the focus of the discussion to the future of world politics under the conditions of globalisation. The responses of the US administration to the attacks in New York and Washington and the Iraq war have provoked an intensive discussion over the unilateral world order in the shadow of the “lone superpower” (Cooper 2003, Daalder and Lindsay 2004, Mead 2004). Many observers have argued that the US will be the only global superpower for some time to come. Apart from the US, it is claimed, there is no other actor in sight that could exert a comprehensive and sustained influence on global governance processes (Kagan 2003). If this were true, the developing countries would no longer have a role to play as effective actors in international politics and global governance.

And yet, at the moment when discussion over the “unilateral world order” reaches its peak, a new debate emerges. This focuses in particular on the rising power of China and India, as well as a number of other "anchor countries" like Brazil and South Africa (Goldmann Sachs 2003, Stamm 2004, Friedman 2005, 1999), and it draws our attention to a new challenge to the global hegemony of the United States in particular, and of the industrially advanced economies in general.

2 China an India as actors of global change? What does the literature tell us?

It is interesting to note that until very recently the increasingly important role of China and India as actors or even Asian Drivers of Global Change has not been perceived in important bodies of literature on global politics, global change and global governance. Until 2003-04 global governance debates on major drivers of global change (world problems and global interdependencies and impacts of globalization processes on the transformation of nations states and new emerging patterns of policy making in the global governance architecture ) did not discuss the importance of China and India as globalization actors (Commission on Global Governance 1995, Rosenau 1997, Held et al. 1999, Donahue and Nye 2000, Kennedy et al. 2002, Zürn 1998).

Important US authors have also ignored the emerging phenomenon of the Asian Drivers. Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004) argues that China is still a very poor country and no real political challenge for the US; Joseph Nye emphasizes that China has to go a long way to become a peer competitor to the United States (Nye 2003, 22); Charles Kupchan (2002) describes Europe as a serious challenge for the only superpower without discussing the future role of the Asian Drivers; Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay (2004) look for new patterns of cooperation in transatlantic relations, without considering that China and India could change the whole situation. Only very recently have some of the leading “global players” in debates on International Relations started to put China (and some of them also India) into their frameworks of global power constellations (Nye 2005, Fischer 2005, Ash 2006).

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3 See, for example, Zarrilli's analysis of the operations of the Codex Alimentarius Committee (Zarrilli 1999: 15)
Since 1990 six alternative maps of the future of global politics have been developed, and none of them includes the Asian Drivers trend:

- Fukuyama's (1992) analysis of the “End of History” perceived a strong trend towards global democratization; the major conflict line of his map of global politics is the struggle between democratic and non-democratic states.
- Mearsheimer (1990) focused on the re-emergence of conflicts between nations states after the collapse of the stable regime of the Cold War. From his point of view, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was the most important challenge. Therefore, a power-oriented security policy the core element of any global strategy. After September 11, authors such as Kagan (2003) argued that the war on terror would be the major conflict of the coming decades. Both Mearsheimer and Kagan put “security” at the top of their agendas.
- Huntington (1996) reflected on the “Clash of Civilizations” between Western and other cultures.
- Paul Kennedy (1994) and Robert Kaplan (1994) describe the major conflict line as the socio-economic asymmetry between the “western world and the rest of the world” (Kennedy 1994). Global poverty, environmental destruction, corruption and failing states in the south are, for them, the main challenges. Development policies and international cooperation between the industrialized western countries and the developing world are important elements to deal with these global risks.
- Thomas Friedman (1999, 2005) analyses the process of economization of global politics. The major conflict lines of his geo-economic map divided those who are able to benefit from liberalization, new technologies and changing global markets and others who believe in state regulation and protectionism – within and between nations.

Global governance discourses since the mid-1990s see a profound transformation of politics in the context of globalization. The key words here are the “end of the Westphalian system”, the erosion of internal and external sovereignty, the blurring between national and international policies and politics, the emerging of new (private) global governance actors and the need to build up of an inclusive global governance architecture in order to deal with the growing number of world problems and global interdependences. The main challenge here is to strengthen a cooperative global multilateralism.

From our perspective, the phenomenon of the Asian drivers might change and challenge all the trends described in the six “world maps” above. A seventh map for global politics would identify the major conflict lines of the next decade as emerging in the interaction between the trends described with the “global governance story” and dynamics shaped by the emergence of China and India as powerful actors in the global economy and its governance.

As a first step in outlining this map, we highlight four areas in which the challenge of the emergence of the Asian drivers will be felt:

- as major shifts in the global power constellation (that might determine the basic pattern of the global governance dynamics during the next decades);
- by the governments of the industrialized countries as China and India offer development alternatives;
- for the governability of global governance institutions in a period of multipolar power constellations;
- by developing countries seeking to prosper in a period of turbulences and change induced by the Asian Drivers, that will redefine the lines between economic winners and losers.

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4 This refers to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the 30 Years War. It enshrined the principle of national sovereignty and the non-interference of one nation state in the affairs of another.
These issues are covered in Sections 3-6. Based on this, we will rise some analytical questions and challenges for global governance theories (sections 7). The hypothesis here is that given the rise of the Asian Drivers of Global Change we have to rethink global governance discourses. How will globalization trends and global governance dynamics look in the shadow of the Asian Drivers Phenomenon?

3 The new power constellation

The “new Asian drivers of global change” are becoming global players who are forcefully altering the relationship between industrialised and developing countries. The rise of China and India as both economic and political actors is having, and will have, significant and far-reaching impacts. While India is not so prominent in world trade and finance as China, it has shown sustained growth for two decades and has good prospects for sustained growth over the next decade (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004: 3, Deutsche Bank Research 2005). By 2020 it is likely to be the world’s third largest economy. It is playing an increasing role in global governance institutions and in leadership among developing countries. China’s impact on the global economy has been more visible. Its share of total US imports rose from 6% in 1995 to 15% in 20045: the OECD’s Economic Survey of China predicts that it will overtake Germany and the United States to become the world’s largest exporter by 2010 (reported in the press, 17 Sept 2005); China’s share of the world demand for key base metals has risen from 5-7% in the early 1990s to 20-25% at present; it holds the world’s second largest currency reserves, amounting to over US$ 670 billion; and China will soon be catching up with the world’s largest CO₂ emitters — on whose future energy policies the dynamics of global climate change will hinge in very crucial ways.

The rise of India and China as significant actors for global governance and the world economy will transform today’s “quasi-unilateral world order” into a de facto multipolar power constellation. By 2025-2030 at the latest, the US, China, India, and possibly Europe will constitute four substantial poles of power in the architecture of global governance. The future interplay among these central actors of global governance will largely determine whether and how the transboundary and global problems of the 21st century are dealt with and what role the world’s developing regions will be able to play in world politics and the world economy. This new multipolar power constellation and the competition for power and policy options resulting from it will become the central line of conflict shaping the architecture of global governance in the coming five decades — in ways much like the system conflict that dominated during the Cold War or the endless conflicts between the Central European powers in the era leading up to the First World War. The future is likely to be shaped by “turbulent multilateralism.”

One major question is, whether this multipolar world will emerge, shaped politically and based on cooperative attitudes an all sides or characterized by sharp conflicts between the old and the new global players. Historical experience demonstrates two things: multipolar international structures are often very unstable and tend to be conflictual (Kupchan 2002); the rise and decline of global political players (hegemonic powers or empires) are normally characterized by conflict, turbulence and even war (Kennedy 1989, Münkler 2005).

Challenges for the industrialized world

The current rise of China and India means that two non-Western countries are becoming substantial actors in the global system. How will the “West” deal with this state of affairs — particularly given the fact that these two non-Western societies are home to more than a third of the world’s population? Charles Kupchan, a member of the US Council on Foreign Relations and an important policy advisor of the Clinton administration, may have asserted that “Globalization is Americanization.” (Kupchan 2002: 72; emphasis in original), but for how much longer? And how long will the Western countries need to understand that this coincidence of interests and power, for years beyond question, might, soon become a thing of the past? For the development policies of the advanced nations, based on a consensus of Western nations, China and India pose big challenges.

One might argue that the rise of China, in particular, presents a challenge to the development project of the Western nations, offering an alternative view of what development is and how to achieve it. The "Beijing Consensus" (Ramo 2005) is one expression of this, but not the only one. Kurlantzick (2005: 28) observes that China is "challenging US 'soft power' — the combination of economic vitality, cultural pull, trade and diplomacy that, as much as military force, has made the US the pre-eminent force in the world." He argues that this is particularly the case in Asia. Thompson (2005) argues in the same direction in the case of Africa, highlighting China's efforts to build alliances in the region and the attractiveness of its practical support (infrastructure, healthcare, education etc.) as well as its policy of "non-interference in domestic affairs", which is particularly welcome to countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, who suffer censure from Western countries.

The rise of China means the rise of an undemocratic, non-liberal state in both the world economy and in the hierarchy of global governance. This may pose problems for the legitimacy of global governance processes, which of course depend not least on the legitimacy of the significant actors that shape them. Will binding worldwide human rights, social, and environmental standards prove even more difficult to implement and entrench in the altered context of global governance? For example, how vulnerable are efforts undertaken in the framework of international development cooperation and aimed at advancing democracy and conflict prevention to targeted attempts to undercut them? China’s close cooperation (providing development cooperation, military training and weapons) and investments in countries with poor human rights records — Zimbabwe, Sudan, Algeria (Alden 2005, Thompson 2005, Taylor 2005) — and its close energy partnerships with Iran and Sudan7 seem to point to some potential lines of conflict. It can at the same time be observed that the “Chinese model” (authoritarian political regime cum market economy) might find admirers in Africa and Latin America.

In this respect, the potential posture of China in global governance is particularly important. In many respects it takes on the posture of a great power, and it has challenged some of the core tenets of international development thinking. It has become markedly more active in the security field, providing policing support in Haiti, and peacekeeping troops in Liberia since 2003. It has expressed support for Myanmar and the Sudan in spite of their poor human rights records. It has developed more active relationships with numerous African and Latin

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6 Of course, Japan is a non-Western actor on the global stage, but unlike China and India, it did take on this role when it was a poor country. It can also be argued that Japan’s economic weight has not, until recently, been turned into political clout. Japan has tended to be a timid and hesitant political actor — unlike China, and increasingly India.

7 The China National Petroleum Corporation has a 40% stake in Sudan’s largest oil venture. In part, this is because of the withdrawal of Western countries because of the security situation (Taylor 2005, 4).
American states, partly because of its economic interests, above all access to raw materials for its booming economy. It has also been more assertive in geopolitics, staking out positions within the UN on the future of Iraq. The West will have to learn to interact with powers possessing growing self-confidence.

More generally, the rise of India and China presents problems of leverage and influence for Western donors. Western countries have limited leverage on China and India. They provide little foreign aid, and while China and India need close cooperation with the western countries in areas like innovation, technology and environmental policies, which implies interdependency, Western countries also need access to fast-growing markets and competitive centres of production and innovation. The challenge for developed countries is to work with self-confident and often demanding partners who cannot be coerced through financial power.

This leverage (or lack of it) question will be felt by Western countries as India and China assume more active roles in global development policy and in aid. They may compete with Western governments for influence, particular when competing for scarce resources, as is being seen in the geopolitics of resources where China, in particular, but also India, are seeking cooperation with developing countries (Venezuela, Sudan, Iran: energy; Latin America: agricultural products; Africa: natural resources).

5 Challenges for institutions of global governance

The thinking of the relevant political actors in China and India is largely dominated by classic concepts of sovereignty and the nation state, even though both countries are fond of making use of multilateral rhetoric. In comparison, decision-makers in the industrialised countries, and Europe in particular have learnt in the context of ongoing globalisation debates, global interdependencies and the limits on the scope for national action that delegation of sovereignty, e.g. to the EU, the use of international cooperation to focus their national governance resources, and a modified understanding of the concept of “non-intervention” (e.g. in cases involving human rights protection versus non-interference in internal affairs) are necessary responses for maintaining the action and problem-solving capacities of politics in a globalised world. Interestingly, the classic understanding of sovereignty and the nation state subscribed to by China and India coincides fully with the political thinking of the present US administration. Viewed against this background, it is easy to understand why China and India, in the summer of 2005, signed on to the Bush administration’s “climate initiative”, while at the same time supporting the multilateral Kyoto process and the ongoing efforts to set clear-cut upper limits for CO2 emissions. Should these basic political patterns solidify in the US, China, and India, this would have major implications for the dynamics of future global governance processes.

Further, even if the world economy reaches a new configuration, history shows that the adjustment pressure outlined above will give rise to turbulent instabilities in the phase of transition to a multipolar power constellation. One conceivable scenario would include big-power rivalries between the established superpower and the new, rising powers. When, during the Asia crisis of 1997-1998, Japan broached the subject of creating an Asian bank mandated to stabilise currencies there, Washington promptly let it be known that The IMF would take care of the matter. What will happen when China and India one day start to develop global governance strategies of their own? Who is to mitigate these instabilities, to moderate them and direct them into cooperative channels? Will the US, today’s lone superpower, prove to be up to this challenge? Could Europe assume this role, or will it continue to be concerned mainly with its own internal affairs?

China and India's new-found willingness to play global roles will create new challenges for global governance and governance institutions. China has in recent years been pursuing
clearly discernible regional strategies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These appear to be geared chiefly to securing its supply of raw materials and energy. Both China and India need to secure energy supplies to support their rapidly-growing economies. China’s energy consumption is projected to double between 2002 and 2015, while India’s consumption will rise by 50% (Energy Information Administration 2005). Both countries will rely increasingly on energy imports. China already imports 45% of its requirements and this is expected to rise to 74% by 2030. Across South Asia as a whole, oil imports already accounted for 72% of consumption in 2000 and this figure is projected to reach 95% by 2030 (IEA 2004). Both countries rely heavily on coal but even here there are shortages of domestic supply. Having been seeking to export coal as recently as 2002, China now struggles hard to meet domestic demand. Similarly, India's imports of coal are projected to rise from 7% of consumption to 71% by 2031 (TERI 2004).

These processes are altering the global markets for raw materials and energy. In other words, the processes outlined above are generating adjustment pressure in the architecture of global governance, giving rise to new constellations of actors and power. Can anyone even conceive that in the year 2030 - i.e. in the context of the emerging multipolar power constellation outlined above — the UN, the WTO, the IMF, or the global climate regime will look the way they do today?

As well challenging the content of global governance, the multi-polar world will also challenge governance processes. Established consensuses will be challenged and the range of influences will be broadened. This is likely to expose the limitations of existing practices for managing conflict and reaching agreements in global governance institutions. New alliances may emerge, such as the agreement between the USA, China, India, South Korea, Japan and Australia on climate change, signed on 26 July 2005, that resulted in a first meeting in January 2006 in order to develop an action plan in the field of energy efficiency technologies. Both "East" and "West" may fracture or line of differently on different issues. From this perspective a fragmented global governance architecture, characterised by centrifugal powers, is much more probable than an inclusive global governance structure.

The roles that China and India will play are far from defined. They will be determined by internal processes and relationships with other countries. As rapidly growing and transforming developing societies, China and India are certainly going to have to master a number of difficult domestic adjustment processes (China's path towards political liberalization and how to deal with growing social polarisation trends; to cite two examples). History shows that internal tensions often result in nationalistic, aggressive foreign policy strategies. Thus, given the growing political weight of China and India in global politics, the future of global governance could depend on their internal governance capacities to manage critical national transformations (Heberer and Senz 2005). These in turn will have ramifications for their relationships with developed and other developing countries.

6 Challenges for developing countries

The biggest challenges arising from the emergence of China and India surely face developing economies. First, there is the question of the rapid change in global competitive conditions as a result of the growth of China and India. Because of their high rates of economic growth, the size of their economies, and the pace of structural change in both countries, the rise of both China and increasingly India is generating enormous adjustment pressure in other regions of the world. Following decades of declining prices for primary goods, the terms of trade for raw materials and agricultural goods have, since 2001, been moving in the opposite direction (Kaplinsky 2005). The reason: demand pull from China and India. In a growing number of sectors, Chinese industrial exports are cutting incisively into the world-market shares of industrial companies from Latin America (Dussel 2005) and Africa. The economic dynamics
in the world’s two most populous countries are leading to significant changes in the world markets for labour, goods, and financial flows.

As other papers in this volume show, the impacts of India and above all China on developing economies are very diverse, creating both winners and losers. Developing country policy makers need to understand and respond to the new global conditions. The "winners" (particularly energy and raw materials exporting countries, will have to deal with the impacts of rising volumes and prices of exports, while the "losers" (both raw materials and energy importers facing rising prices and countries facing competition from cheap manufactured good in both their domestic and export markets) will face difficult adjustment processes.

The emergence of India and China as development actors will have further impacts on developing countries in at least three areas. First, it might open up new development options for these countries, most notably in relation to development options. When Angola wanted a $2 billion loan it wanted to avoid the IMF. It went to China instead, and in return China gained access to the Angolan oil industry (Alden 2005: 6). Such interventions may act as a counterweight to liberalisation agendas pursued by the developed countries.

Second, China and India have the capacity to engage in global governance debates and influence policy formulation, particularly in areas such as the considerations over trade issues. The increasing size and competitiveness of their economies may also create de facto standards setting power. For example, China has developed its own organic standard, the "Green Food" label (IFAD 2005: 9-12). Similarly, the growth of India and Chinese industrial enterprises might challenge the hegemony of Western transnationals in areas of intellectual property. This shows that they have the capacity, for example, to participate in technical negotiations around standards setting, providing an expression of the needs and priorities of developing countries, which often been marginalised. All that might result in some advantages for other developing countries – as long as their interests and the interests of China and India coincide. But at the same time the emergency of these two new capable global standard setting powers implies for all the standard takers of the south additional threats to their national sovereignty.

Third, China and India may introduce countervailing power to the hegemony the U.S.-led Bretton Woods institutions. What might be the impact of the emergence of China and India as powerful actors in global governance institutions on the voice of other developing countries? In this respect, the critical question is whether India and China will play the role of “advocates” of the interests of the developing countries (as India did within the G77 group of developing countries), possibly risking the emergence of new North-South tensions, or alternatively pursue primarily to their own interests, which need not at all coincide with the interests of the world’s other developing economies?

Developing country participation within global governance institutions and the activities of lead nations has often been informed by ideologies of common interests. India has frequently presented itself as a leader of the developing world. South Africa after apartheid and Brazil (particularly since the election of Lula as president) have consciously taken up this role. The fact that India, Brazil and South Africa created in 2003 a democratic G3 of the South, not integrating China, is a signal, that these countries are proactively trying to play a more prominent role as non OECD – countries in a world perceived as G7/G8 driven. They see themselves as voicing the interests of poor countries. Is this auto-perception convincing? Such a role need not preclude the pursuit of self-interest. Brazil it capable of pursuing pro poor initiatives in the UN and voicing a multilateral rhetoric while simultaneously adopting regional policies towards Mercosur, that are guided by very clear articulated economic self interests. It is too early to tell. While China and India, together with Brazil and South Africa provided effective leadership of a large group of developing countries at Cancun in 2003 this leadership (offered and accepted) may turn out to be the exception rather than the rule.
The Asian drivers challenging the global governance discourse: Dimensions of a research programme

The discussion about the impacts of the Asian drivers (ADs) on global change and on global governance concepts is at an early stage. Until now the global governance discourse has not yet internalized the Asian drivers phenomenon. This short paper cannot fill all the gaps, but some analytical questions for further research can be formulated. These questions are focused on the main areas of research of the global governance discourse. Our brief outline is meant to illustrate the potentially far-reaching implications and trends of the rise of China and India in the hierarchy of global governance.

First question: Which world problems and global interdependencies are gaining importance or are emerging as a result of the rise of China and India in the global governance arena?

Some answers are clear: issues like global energy consumption, global resource consumption (copper, metals etc.), climate change (as a result of rapidly growing CO2 emissions) and the challenge of “global sustainable development” in the shadow of dynamic economic development in China and India will be of major importance. The competition between China, India and the United States (and maybe Europe) might be another new world problem that will determine stability/instability and cooperation/conflict in the international system.

Second question: Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom et al. 1999) formulated – based on her expertise on “local commons” - some lessons on collective action problems and major challenges for political systems when it comes to global challenges and global interdependencies. She emphasized five main points: a) scaling-up problems (more actors, more veto players, rising complexities and causalities of global challenges etc.); b) cultural diversity challenges (governance needs common standards, norms and values; difficult to achieve in nation states and even more challenging in the emerging world society); c) complications of interlinked common-pool resources (emergence of global systemic risks: international financial markets, global climate change, poverty, conflicts, etc.); d) accelerating rates of change (mobility of capital, technological change, etc. are challenging the adaptability of national and global political institutions); e) “We have only one globe” (that means that we have less leeway for mistakes as in the field of local problems and local commons). Do (and how do) the Asian Drivers strengthen, weaken, reduce, modify or reverse these challenges for collective action in the field of global interdependencies and global common (and will the answer be different regarding different global commons)?

Third question: How do the Asian Drivers strengthen, weaken, reduce, modify or reverse major trends within the global governance arenas that the global governance discourse emphasizes in order to distinguish the “classical international political system” from the “global governance world”? The emergence of the Asian Drivers adds new levels of complexity to what is already a multilevel and multi-actor global system, introducing new public and private actors to influence the processes of establishing norms, rules and standards (formal and informal).

Fourth question: How do the Asian Drivers and the “new power constellation” between them, the US and maybe Europe (multipolar, turbulent, instable) modify the institutional setting and the policies of international regimes and organizations – and therefore the overall global governance landscape (s. figure 1)?
Fifth question: How do the Asian Drivers strengthen, weaken, modify or reverse major concepts of new global governance patterns developed within the global governance discourse, such as:

- governance without government (Rosenau/ Czempiel 1992),
- complex multilateralism (Goetz et al 2000),
- societal multilateralism (Zürn 2004),
- global public policy networks (Reinicke 1998),
- multilevel, multi-actor global governance architecture (Messner/ Nuscheler 2003),
- private governance (Streeck 2005),
- government without governance (Brock 2001)?

And how do the Asian Drivers change the importance of such concepts, if we intend to understand the overall global governance system?

Some hypothesis in this field could be:

- The AD will strengthen the trend towards renewed inter-governmentalism (weakening the concept “governance without government”), because very classical concepts of the nation state and of foreign policy strategies are still dominating in China and India (like in the United States). But: renewed inter-governmentalism is not appropriate to deal with complex global interdependencies.
China is weakening the concepts of “societal and complex multilateralism” (which emphasize the important role of private actors in global governance processes), as a result of its non-liberal political system.

Conflicts between China, India and the United States could undermine the foundations of the multilateral system (and imply that global issues like poverty, sustainability, global health and other are losing importance in the global governance arena).

China will undermine social, environmental and human rights standards that emerged in global public policy networks during the last two decades.

A research programme is needed to lay bare the precise contours of the terrain of global change and to answer the questions outlined above. The first step in such a research programme would be to understand better the postures that these countries take with regard to global governance. Relevant dimensions of research and questions include:

1. **Engagement in global governance arenas:** In which areas of global governance are these countries playing pro-active roles (agenda setting capacities; mobilising other countries, organising voting blocs, being able to build ad hoc and or stable coalitions; spending money in international affairs; organising global conferences), and in which fields are their roles more passive? Are these roles primarily at regional level, or are they exercised on global scale? What implications does this have for other developing countries, and how should they respond.

2. **How do these countries approach international politics?:** (i) expressing narrowly defined national interests, (ii) actively seeking enhancement of regional leadership roles, (iii) actively seeking global leadership roles within the developing country grouping, (iv) identifying themselves as leading global actors, irrespective of developing countries? Are they the same, or are they very different? What would these different roles imply for other developing countries?

3. **How do India and China approach the following pillars of global governance:** a) cooperative multilateralism versus unilateralism; b) international system based on rules of law versus avoiding international binding rules (e.g. ICC); c) strong UN versus weak UN; d) regional cooperation and integration as an answer to globalization (e.g. European Union) versus strategies to strengthen political power of the dominant countries within the region (US – Latin America).

4. **Patterns of Power:** Four main forms of power can be distinguished: a) power via relations with other actors (influencing many actors by direct interaction); b) the power of being able to organize cooperation and trust, to convince others and to be attractive for others (soft power); c) institutional power (being able to invest in global governance institutions, regimes, standard setting processes: influencing many by defining the rules of the game); d) power via force/compulsion (be able to force others based on military power, political dominance, financial capabilities). Which forms of power do the “Asian drivers of global change” use/are they able to build up?

5. **Private actors of global governance:** How do these countries view and deal with the ‘new’ private actors in world politics? (NGOs on the one hand and the business sector on the other?)? To what extent are new private actors emerging from these countries, and what agendas do they have? More generally, how do China and India challenge the power of developed countries and their transnational companies to set the rules of international business (Intellectual Property Rights, TRIMs, etc.), both within formal global governance institutions and through de facto exercises of power (for example, the USDA’s role as setter of pharmaceutical standards)? Will such challenges open up new opportunities for other developing countries, or pose new threats?

6. **The internal politics and policy dimensions:** How do the political elites in both countries perceive the increasing international importance of their country, and how is their emerging role in world politics discussed? What political consensuses exist within these countries about their positions within the region and in world politics? Are the currently guiding
approaches dominating in China and India about their roles as “Actors of Global Change” fixed or in transition?

The internal polity dimension: To be an active and influential global governance player a) effective institutional capacities (ministry of foreign affairs and other internationally oriented ministries), b) strategic capabilities of the diplomatic corps (global governance school, training of diplomats) and c) investments in the research of international affairs, globalisation processes etc. in order to create “soft power capacities” (universities, think tanks, publications in this field) are needed. Are there differences in the ways that China and India are preparing to play a significant role in these fields, and how will their interests and strategies impact upon other developing countries?
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